The 1709 Blog: When claimants stand up for copyright, defendants can get sent down

The 1709 Blog: When claimants stand up for copyright, defendants can get sent down: the sad story of a Mr Fletcher, who (reminding me of his namesake in the Ronnie Barker TV show, Porridge) ended up being sentenced to 28 days' imprisonment, suspended for a year, after displaying considerable reluctance to pay for the music he played in his nightclub. PPL, the relevant licensing body, seems to have been fairly generous in allowing him time to pay, but the summary of the case (which is only available to Lawtel subscribers, being an ex tempore judgment by Arnold J) shows that he allowed ever opportunity to slip through his fingers.



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Sci-Hub Tears Down Academia's "Illegal" Copyright Paywalls | TorrentFreak

TorrentFreak reports that a website called Sci-Hub is challenging - illegally - the learned journal publishing model. It is the creation of a researcher from Kazakhstan who found it impossible (because prohibitively expensive) to gain access to the scientific articles that she needed. It raises important questions about what the publishers bring to the party: peer review, of course, but not much else (and do publishers ever contribute much else?). When the authors aren't paid, yet there is a ready supply of them required to publish in peer-reviewed journals, the result is little more than a tax on research which even the authors often have to pay - which effectively denies access to those without the wherewithal to pay.



Although copyright does not protect information, combined with paywalls it can result in an extremely restrictive environment.



For her trouble, the creator of the site is getting sued, a rather predictable outcome: but perhaps it's a precursor of a change in the way information of this sort is disseminated.



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Copying material for private use: is it legal?

The UK Human Rights Blog reports on the very important copyright/administrative law case,  British Academy of Songwriters, Composers And Authors & Ors, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation And Skills [2015] EWHC 1723 (Admin) (19 June 2015)*, the work of a court and a judge rarely if ever before engaged on intellectual property issues. Green J held that the government was wrong to create a permitted act of private copying, by the Copyright and Rights in Performance (Personal Copies for Private Use) Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/2361) which inserted new section 28B into the increasingly-unrecognisable Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The problem lies in the directive that the government has to comply with in doing this, Directive 2001/29, popularly known as the Information Society directive, Art. 5 of which provides (in pertinent part):

2. Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations for the reproduction right provided for in Article 2 in the following cases:

…

(b) in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, on condition that the rightholders receive fair compensation which takes account of the application or non-application of technological measures referred to in Article 6 to the work or subject-matter concerned;

...




5. The exceptions and limitations provided for in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall only be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.

The government took the view that there was no need to provide for any compensation for rights holders, for the simple reason that there was no loss to compensate. The price had been set (and the rightholder remunerated) on the assumption that these private copies would be made. The permitted copying was of a copy which the individual already owned: it was nothing more than format-shifting.

The government had concluded that little or no harm would be caused to the rightholder. The judge took the view that there was not enough evidence for them to reach this conclusion. While he rejected the applicants' other contentions, on this point he found in their favour, and back to the drawing board goes the government.

Does this make sense? It seems to be predicated on the "normal exploitation" including selling new formats instead of allowing format-shifting. Of course, once the private copying snowball starts to roll there are sure to be copies being made for friends and family, but that doesn't seem to me to be reason to reject a limited private copying permitted act (or "exception" as the Directive will call it). The fact that such copying might take place is quite outside the scope of the permitted act, and doesn't affect the case for permitting what is permitted. Format-shifting should be a neutral event, and the copyright owner should not be allowed to think that his or her legitimate interests or the normal exploitation of the work extend to format-shifting. No-one in the real world imagines that it does, and the law must acknowledge this.

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*You may also like to read the summary provided by the ICLR: [2015] WLR(D) 268. In many ways it is preferable to the 318-paragraph, 107-page, blockbuster which is Green J's judgment.

Sir Hugh Laddie Memorial Lecture: Alex Kozinski

I have written elsewhere recently about the undesirability of hero-worship. I think an old friend, with whom I have regrettably lost touch, might once have numbered Chief Judge Alex Kozinski among his heroes (but I won’t put words into his mouth). One day many years ago he left a message with my secretary in which he purported to be the judge. Not knowing the name, I was unimpressed.


I did learn the name not long afterwards. I came across his dictum in EffectsAssociates,Inc. v. Cohen 908F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) in which he pithily summed up the defendant’s argument about the lack of documentation to support the existence of a copyright assignment: ‘Moviemakers do lunch, not contracts’. He also decided (if I remember correctly) Kremen v Cohen, in which a domain name was treated a property. Later I encountered him as the computer games reviewer for the Wall Street Journal, and of course the author of many impressive opinions.


I have, and need, only a passing acquaintance with US law, but Judge Kozinski looms large in what I do know. Perhaps that is at least in part because he sits in the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, or the Hollywood Circuit as he apparently would have it, or the Internet circuit, or the fun circuit, according to the first chairman of the evening, Daniel Alexander QC (standing in for Sir Robin Jacob, who had another commitment and arrived only at the end of the lecture): the largest Circuit in the USA, with a population equal to that of the UK, and an area the size of India.


Kozinski is not only a judge but a prolific, gifted and careful author (and indeed a sometime blogger, though I recall his blog disappearing under mysterious circumstances). In one article, Lawsuit Schmawsuit, he (and Eugene Volokh – the chairman omitted to identify the co-author) discusses the use of the term chutzpah in litigation and the replacement of Latin with Yiddish in legal usage. (A questioner later asked how to translate chutzpah into Latin: “confidentia” seems to be the most likely candidate word.)

His Sir Hugh Laddie Memorial Lecture last night was accompanied by a comprehensive selection of images, and even musical excerpts, which illustrated one of his main themes (of which more in a moment). To begin with he showed us the Pasadena courthouse where he has his chambers and which is close to Hollywood, and the San Francisco one close to Silicon Valley, geographical facts which go a long way to explaining the reputation of the Circuit.

Remarking that IP in general is growing, and has become a bread and butter area for law firms and no longer an obscure speciality, he observed that while at one time patent attorneys had been merely geeks and wierdos they were now (and I’m paraphrasing slightly as my typing could not always keep up with his delivery, which at times was not as clear as I would have liked either) in the mainstream, although still geeks and wierdos. (Maybe if Sir Robin had been present we might have had a discussion about nerds, too.) It has always provided challenging and exciting cases for judges and they now also enjoy high visibility.

Much of the lecture jumped about in a slightly disjointed way. The judge spent a lot of the time talking about some of the most famous cases on which he say, beginning with his opinion in Facebook v Connectu (2011), which you can watch on YouTube here, the main importance of which seemed to be the thousands of cites and quotes of his opinion, including some in Romanian so he said he hoped his old schoolmates were eating their hearts out.


Presenting complicated arguments

Passing quite swiftly over the Bratz case, Mattel v MGA – the law in which he described as “dull stuff” which nevertheless received a great deal of publicity, and remarking (according to my imperfect transcibing) that “Blogs and tweets speak much more loudly than [pious] sentiments” (anyone with a better recollection please clarify – it seemed like a phrase that should be recorded for posterity, though the context has become lost), he came to the first big point in his lecture. The subject matter of these cases is often complicated, and it is difficult for the judges to grasp the facts, so:

The judge pointed to Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc. 964 F.2d 965 as an example of how to simplify matters for the judge (though I think the brief to which he referred must have been prepared for the trial judge, and indeed Judge Kozinski did not sit on the appeal as far as I can see). In that case, Galoob made a device called the Game Genie which could be used to change the rules of a computer game (in suit, Super Mario 3). Nintendo sued for copyright infringement. In a brief which Judge Kozinski showed the audience on the screen but which I can’t find to show you, Jerry Faulk, counsel for Galoob, told the story of Debra, an 11 year old girl, who starts her afternoon reading Charlotte’s Web but cannot resist the temptation to jump to the end to check how the story ends: then watches Casablanca on a VCR (these cases are not new), fast-forwarding through the bits that don’t interest her, then finally (her brothers being at the beach) manages a rare computer game session, in which she chooses (using the Game Genie) to start in World 3 rather than at the beginning of the game. Why, counsel asked, should this last act infringe copyright when the others didn’t? Thwarting the author’s chosen order of events should not be an infringement – and the court (and the appeals court) held that indeed it wasn’t. But the speaker’s point, of course, was concerned with the story-telling not the outcome.

Moving on to Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986), which concerned the song ‘When Sunny Gets Blue’ made famous by Johnny Mathis (described by Kozinski as “on the saccharine side of sweet”) and what claimed to be a parody, ‘When Sonny Sniffs Glue’, he asked: “What good is it being a federal judge if you have to hum your own music?”. You can, it seems, despatch a law clerk to obtain recordings for you. (They can also write your opinion for you, once you have decided what the outcome ought to be.) He played extracts from both for our delectation.

Why sue?

The Fisher case led the speaker into the second big question of the evening: Why sue? Fisher was after someone who he thought had despoiled his creation. “He wanted us,” said the Judge, “to spank the guy”. Corporations are no better: take Mattell v MCA where the toy-maker sued for trade mark infringement in the song Barbie Girl by Aqua, a piece of music which was doomed to obscurity until Mattel gave it a boost. Judge Kozinski said there were several ways in which Mattel could have dealt with the upstart song: They could have sent round a large bottle of Dom Pérignon – thanking the group for keeping the Barbie name in the public eye. They could have bought up all copies of the sound recording for less than the cost of a lawsuit. Or they could have bought the rights to the song and ensured it was never heard again. But they sued: “The whole Megillah”, as he described it, bringing Hebrew into legal parlance and contributing to my education. (I’d noted it originally as “Magill”, for which any European IP lawyer of a certain age can surely be excused, and which rather baffled me at the time.) And at the end of the court’s opinion, after a summary of other steps the parties had taken in puruance of the dispute, the judge added famously: “The parties are advised to chill”. A few years later Mattel came out with a new commercial using a version of the song. “Why couldn’t they have done that to begin with?” Kozinski asked.

His explanation certainly resonated with me, and with many others I suspect: IP rights holders tend to be total control freaks. At every turn they fear the worst. Our speaker recommended a reading of an article entitled “Is the sky falling on the content industries?” by Mark Lemley, which I will do because he’s always an entertaining writer, although I do loathe the expression “content industry” (and indeed the use of the word “content”). Rightsholders, Kozinski pointed out, have opposed every technical advance since Gutenberg – photography, player pianos, gramophones, over-the-air tv, photocopying, and the VCR (in the Betamax case, Sony v Universal Studios – the link is to EFF’s resources page from which you can find the judgment). The studios feared that recording films off TV would lead to the death of cinema (or “theatre”, as they call it in the US). Then Hollywood discovered that VCRs were actually a goldmine for them – much bigger than the theatre market.

A similar fear lay behind another case,Vestron v HBO, involving the Oliver Stone film ‘Platoon’ (how much more apposite had it been Apocalypse Now). Vestron held the rights to home distribution but the studio decided nevertheless to distribute it through HBO. An injunction ws granted despite HBO saying it would destroy the market. Three months later the case settled, and the injunction was lifted. Variety reported that the pent-up demand created by the injunction would actually result in increased sales – the sky had not fallen. Kozinski observed that parties to litigation often make doomsday predictions and the judges have to keep them in check. A more recent example was Garcia v Google. Google argued that to uphold the plaintiff’s claim would be to destroy the internet and copyright law (though Google seem to me to do a pretty good job of the latter already, but that’s another story). Garcia argued she risked being killed. Neither has happened. (She lost because she had no copyright in her performance: Sir Robin Jacob later pointed out that English law would have provided her with better protection.)


Publicity rights and controlling thought

Moving on to talk about the right of publicity, a matter of State not federal law and particularly strongly protected in California, he explained that his dissent in White v Samsung had been designed to get into case books – his aim being “to get to law students before the professors get to them”. In Wendt and Ratzenberger v Host International two actors from the series Cheers sued a company that ran themed bars in airports and included in the get-up two animatronic figures supposed to resemble the plaintiffs. However, a copyright licence from the people who made the TV show weakened the case, Judge Kozinski failed to prevail over the other judges and the court supported actors. Some time later, during a layover at Kansas City airport, he called in at a Cheers bar. The animatronic figures were still there and looked nothing like the actors: the defendant’s lawyer should have brought them into court, he suggested (reverting to the “simplify, simplify, simplify” theme).

Mentioning Douglas v Mattel (the Beverley Hill Billies case), about which I noted very little, Judge Kozinski observed that these cases show the plaintiffs trying to control speech, and therefore indirectly and inevitably to control thinking. “The plaintiffs want people to pay money just to think about them.” A robust copyright law and free speech are difficult to reconcile, as the Gay Olympics case (SF Arts and Athletics v US Olympic Committee) of 1982 shows. It goes beyond normal trade mark law, conferring ownership of the word Olympic on the US Committee. The Court supported the US Olympic Committee, with Judge Kozinski dissenting. That this was an attempt to control thought was reinforced by the fact that use had been permitted for police Olympics, dog Olympics, and handicapped Olympics: to prohibit this new use amounted to controlling talking about gay rights. But the Supreme Court affirmed.


Nominative fair use

He turned next to what he called his single greatest contribution to IP law, New Kids on the Block v News America Publishing. The defendant had asked questions about the band and its members (which one would you most like to move in next door, and such like). Was this an infringement of the trade mark? While copyright (in the US at any rate) had exceptions for parody and fair use trade mark law did not, so there was no easy way out. But the name was not being used as a trade mark: it caused people to think about the band but was not trade mark use, a position which he found was supported by no case law. So how to get the case to come out right? His law clerk suggested calling it nominative fair use, and the judge said “Sounds good to me”. They wrote the opinion and the other two judges signed on. Twenty years later he came back to it and found a whole body of case law.


The Streisand effect and the limits of the law

Finally, he spoke of the limits of the legal system in resolving disputes. There might be a clear infringement but no way to get remedy. Bringing a lawsuit might do more harm than good – Barbie Girl was a case in point. So too is Monster v Vermonster (or more correctly I think Hansen Beverage Co v Rock Art Brewery). The husband and wife team who made the beer went to the court of public opinion: the video from which the judge showed us an extract is here (I had to restrain my inclination to applaud them when the clip finished) and they gained 17,000 Likes on Faacebook before Monster backed off. “Electronic pebbles”, as Kozinski called these weapons, “in hands of modern day Davids aimed at corporate Goliaths.”

The same could be said of the mock Kit Kat commercial which sought to force Nestlé to top buying palm oil: the company asked YouTube to take it down, and instead of the desired result it went viral. This is what is known as the Streisand effect, after the actress and singer took exception to having photos of her house shown on the Internet. Initially hard to find, her actions caused copies to pop up all over the internet. The same effect can be observed in the Plesner case, in which a Danish art student sought to draw attention to the gap between rich and poor with a tee-shirt design featuring a starving child with a Louis Vuitton bag. Not only did the infringement action fail, the bad publicity for the trade mark owner was huge – it would have been better had they embraced it and adopted the campaign (though perhaps they thought it was in part at least aimed at them, and their customers).

Part of the job of IP lawyers is to persuade clients to accept infringements. Often they are better off that way. They should move on (or chill?) and make the best of it.

NIPC Law: Copyright: Minder Records and Another v Sharples

Another reposting (because there's no point in repeating Jane's good work) from NIPC Law: Copyright: Minder Records and Another v Sharples: Jane Lamber t S.10 (1) of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 defines a work of joint authorship as "a work ..." - you'll need to go to the original to read the rest.

London Taxi Corp sues over Metrocab

Bloomberg reports (15 June) that the manufacturers of classic black London taxis, now owned by Chinese manufacturer Geely, is taking exception to a new environmentally-friendly rival, Metrocab. One of the partners in the Metrocab company, which like The London Taxi Corporation is based, as any respectable British vehicle manufacturer should be, in Coventry (or Abingdon, of course, or Malvern), is Frazer-Nash research: so are the new cabs to be chain-driven?

So far there appears only to have been a preliminary hearing, The London Taxi Corporation Ltd. v. Frazer Nash Research Ltd. & Anr, High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, HC14B01502. (It turns out, now that the judgment is available - see below - that it was an application relating to survey evidence, which the judge Spearman J was not inclined to allow.) Bloomberg reports that London Taxi alleges that Metrocab "breaches its trademarks", which they would not have written had they paid attention. The verb is "infringe" not "breach" and trade mark is two words ... But London Taxi Corporation has several registered trade marks covering the shape and appearance of their product (for example this one), so potentially there is infringement. Are the trade marks vulnerable to attack on the grounds that the design is generic, I wonder? And is the Metrocab similar enough for there to be a likelihood of confusion? It certainly looks significantly different to me, but I might not be an average user of London cabs.

Update: The London Taxi Corporation Ltd (t/a the London Taxi Company) v Frazer-Nash Research Ltd & Anor [2015] EWHC 1840 (Ch) (03 July 2015)

Inventions and Patents - FT Special report

There is a Special Report on Inventions and Patents published by the Financial Times today, which includes a summary of progress on the Unitary Patent and an article on the impact the calculation of royalty calculations for standards-essential patents in the mobile telecomms sector - otherwise the legal content of the Report looks a bit thin, although all of it will probably be interesting to IP specialists.



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The New European Patent by Alfredo Ilardi

There is an endless stream of interesting intellectual property events in Oxford, to which I always intend to go. Unfortunately, even living a mere 20 miles away, getting into the city is far from simple. Those medieval town planners failed completely to make the place car-friendly, and the profusion of bicycles with particularly (on average) idiotic riders makes driving an unattractive option. There is a bus from the village, but not necessarily a bus back at a convenient time. The train from Didcot is a good choice, but the station is five miles away and parking often ludicrously expensive. So, to cut a long story short, I haven't been to more than a couple of IP events in Oxford in all the time I have lived here.

Receiving an invitation to a book launch, for Alfredo Ilardi's "The New European Patent", published by Hart, Oxford's smaller legal publisher, stiffened my resolve. Meeting the Hart people, especially the founder Richard Hart (a noted runner), was an attraction, and who knows who else might be there? Very few people, turned out to be the answer, and only one member of staff from the publisher, the founder being at another launch party. I learnt from her that the company is now part of Bloomsbury, still presumably spending the Harry Potter millions on acquisitions.

Alfredo Ilardi, former Head of the Collection of Laws and Treaties of the World Intellectual Property Organization, has produced a worthy book. I take issue with its title, as its subject is not a new European patent but a new European Union patent, as the blurb makes clear:

"On 17 December 2012, following a complex negotiation which lasted 12 years, theEuropean Parliament adopted Regulations (EU) 1257/2012 and 1260/2012 and the text of the Agreement on a Unified Patent Court (UPC Agreement). These instruments institute the ‘European patent with unitary effect’, the first unified system for the protection of inventions within the European Union. The two Regulations will be applicable after the entry into force of the UPC Agreement, which was signed on 19 February 2013 by 24 Member States of the European Union. This book traces the evolution of the idea behind the institution of the European patent with unitary effect, including a comparative analysis of the existing parallel regional and international procedures for the protection of inventions. It presents a synthesis of the different phases of the negotiations which led to the adoption of the first unitary patent system within the European Union. In addition it examines the provisions of the two Regulations, of the UPC Agreement and of the jurisdictional system under Brussels I Regulation. Finally, it reproduces in the Appendix the texts of Regulations (EU) 1257 and 1260/2012 and of the UPC Agreement."

But the subject-matter is important, whatever it might be called. A brief glance t the book, however, showed me that the author (as you might expect) takes a rather historical approach, so it might be a bit short on substance: not a practitioner's book, I suspect. And as if to demonstrate the difference between the practical and the academic, which I always tell students are more closely-related in the IP field than in other areas of law, the author extols the virtues of the Community trade mark system. I cannot refrain from responding. To my mind the CTM is an almost unmitigated disaster, a bully's charter, encouraging foreclosure and depletion to such an extent that new entrants are hard-pressed to find a mark to use and established businesses from outside the EU can find their established trade mark useless in the face of ludicrously wide registrations that can only be challenged for lack of good faith (for which read, cannot be challenged). If the Unitary patent turns out the same way, it will not be a Good Thing by any measure except that of the multinationals who will find it conducive to the arrogation of market power.

My brief perusal of the book also took in what I always check for in law books: how many pages are real book, and how many mere stuffing (legislation and the like)? At 164 pages (hardback) it's not unreasonably short, but more than half of it comprises appendices of one sort or another. It makes it very expensive, per page of text, especially nowadays when the legislation is freely available online and in any event is mostly not yet final and likely therefore to change. I may be doing it an injustice: I had only a brief look at the book, and if the UPC will be your stamping ground once you are allowed to stamp in it, this book will surely be essential reading. So too, and perhaps more practical, will be Hugh Dunlop's "European Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court", the second edition of which was pubished last year by CIPA and which is about one-third (90 pages) text and the rest appendices, probably the same ones as in the Hart book. Now I've got it down from the high shelf where it had rested since I received it, I'll have a look at it and write a review. That's easier when you have a copy of the book ...

Details of the Hart book: ISBN 9781849468336. RSP: £65 / US$130 / CDN$130.
http://www.hartpub.co.uk/books/details.asp?ISBN=9781849468336

Copying Is Not Creativity! Why Creative Artists Don’t Need the Public Domain - Office of Copyright

Copying Is Not Creativity! Why Creative Artists Don’t Need the Public Domain is a very interesting and thought-provoking blog post by Stephen Carlisle JD, Copyright Officer of Nova Southeastern University in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Refuting the oft-cited dictum of either Stravinsky or Picasso, to the effect that great artists steal (he cites evidence that they didn't say it, which actually seems to be more like a lack of evidence that they did, along with a quote from TS Eliot that is supposedly what people think they are referring to, which became somewhat distorted because it really extols the virtues not of copying but of transforming an inferior piece of work), he takes issue with Judge Alex Kozinski (a brave move) who expressed the view (in his dissenting opinion in White v. Samsung Electronics America, 969 F.2d 1512, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1993 at page 1513) that everything in history has relied on copying:

“Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today, likely nothing since we tamed fire is genuinely new: Culture, like science and technology grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came before. Overprotection stifles the very creative forces it’s supposed to nurture.”

Creative people not only don't need a public domain, Mr Carlisle argues, but it actually holds them back from being truly creative. Copyright doesn't protect ideas (or, you might say, ideas are firmly in the public domain), and that is what creative people need to work with. Great stuff. Copyright might be over-powerful, but what is needed (to my mind - this is not Mr Carlisle speaking) is not the present constant process of erosion - death by a thousand permitted acts, or "exceptions" as the philistines in government prefer - but a fundamental reappraisal of some key issues, like the worthless originality test.

In an earlier posting, which I found following a link from the artist's Facebook page (in the modern world that is how these things happen), Mr Carlisle had criticised the decision of Judge Jesse Furman in Dean v. Cameron, 2014 WL 4638355, Southern District of New York, 2014, to dismiss Roger Dean's claim against the director of the motion picture Avatar. Read his explanation of where the court went wrong by considering individual Dean artworks rather than the "total concept and feel" of his oeuvre - which no-one could deny is original and distinctive, and which many commentators also feel is reflected in the Cameron film. Even Mr Cameron seems to admit that Dean's work was a major influence (but then again, who could visualise a fantasy world without paying homage to the master?).

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Whisky Galore

Whisky Galore - Whyte and MacKay Ltd v Origin Wine UK Ltd  is another piece I am reposting (well, just posting a link to: rather different) by Jane Lambert. One of those problems that is inevitable with the use of weak trade marks I think.

In defence of my use of the same headline as Jane, of course it was coined originally by a famous fellow West Hartlepudlian, who as well as being an author was also a founder of the SNP - reinforcing, perhaps, the argument that northern England should be allowed to choose whether to go with its close neighbours on the other side of the border rather than its more remote neighbours in London.

Court of Appeal will not interfere with settlement agreement, adopts broad(ish) interpretation

H&M's underwired bras get no support from Court of Appeal, reports Jeremy under a typically inspired headline on PatLit: the patent litigation weblog. No point in my repeating what he has already done so well ... 

What was this all about? An infringer squirming uncomfortably, trying to grasp at the one straw within its reach, perhaps - it certainly looks like it. Interesting to note (though it is perfectly logical if you stop to think about it) that if the patent holder establishes that the settlement agreement precludes a validity challenge by the infringer, it loses the possibility of alleging infringement and is left with an action for breach of the settlement agreement. Also interesting to note that the court will adopt a fairly broad view of what the agreement means - as it did not specify what test should be used, any conventional test could be applied. That surely accords with what the patentee must have had in mind when the agreement was made, and the infringer should have realised that they would not be let easily off the hook by agreeing to terms that favoured them.

Issue. Rule. Analysis. Conclusion.

Legal Solutions Blog What Law School Didn’t Teach You: Observations from ACC’s Corporate Counsel University

Ask any lawyer what “IRAC” means, and s/he will instinctively recite this law school mantra: Issue.  Rule.  Analysis.  Conclusion.  Identify the multitude of issue(s) that are present in a fact pattern; identify the applicable rules or regulations; analyze the respective facts against said rules; and voila– a legal conclusion. - See more at: http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/corporate-counsel/what-law-school-didnt-teach-you-observations-from-accs-corporate-counsel-university/#sthash.R5d8MOR7.dpuf

Online course on commercialisation of IP from EPO

The European Patent Office offers "virtual classroom lessons" on Commercialisation of IP. Why, I don't know - it's a worthy enough subject, but why should a public institution be moving outside its core function to provide education in competition with many private-sector organisations, which pay the taxes that (presumably - though perhaps it is run entirely out of operating revenue) keep the EPO going? And even if you think it is legit for such an institution to be running courses, why commercialisation rather than something that the institution actually does? You'd have thought it would concentrate first on ensuring that people understood its own operations, how to draw up applications, and the substantive law of the Convention and supporting instruments. Still, it could be interesting and is certainly not expensive.

NIPC Law: Be careful for what you wish for when seeking an interim injunction.

Another reposting from Jane Lambert's blog: NIPC Law: Be careful for what you wish for when seeking an i...: Jane Lambert Whenever a court grants an interim injunction, or a respondent offers an undertaking, to do or refrain from ...

Monopoly power in the Eighteenth Century British Book Trade

As much to ensure I don't overlook it as to bring it to your attention, here is a link to an interesting-looking paper by David Fielding (Department of Economics, University of Otago, New Zealand) and Shef Rogers (Department of English and Linguistics, University of Otago, New Zealand) entitled Monopoly power  in the Eighteenth Century British Book Trade and therefore deeply involved with the origins of copyright law.



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NIPC Law: Wrapped up: Everseal Stationery Products Ltd v Document Management Solutions Ltd

Another reposting from my friend Jane Lambert's excellent NIPC Law blog.  Everseal Stationery Products Ltd v Document Management Solutions Ltd. and Others  [2015] EWHC 842 (IPEC) (1 April 2015) is a patent case from the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court, following a hearing a couple of years ago in which the defendant failed to get a declaration of non-infringement. No new law in it, as Jane observes, but a good illustration and possibly a case to mention in a skeleton argument. As my task for today involves working on the IP module of the University (formerly College) of Law's LPC, that has given me an idea ...

Appropriation art: weekend reading

"On Art Attacks: At the Confluence of Shock, Appropriation, and the Law" is a paper by my friend and fellow runner, Rachel Buker (see My Running Friends in the Law in the sidebar) which I just came across (via her posting in the Art and Artifice blog) and am looking forward to reading, but which I wanted to draw to the attention of my reader ...

NIPC Law: Red Berries - Bodo Sperlein Ltd v Sabichi Ltd

Assessing whether copyright has been infringed in the absence of direct evidence: Reposting from NIPC Law: Red Berries - Bodo Sperlein Ltd v Sabichi Ltd [2015] EWHC 1242 (IPEC) (8 May 2015).

Starbucks (HK) v British Sky Broadcasting Group (Supreme Court)

One thing that baffled me about this case when I saw the first instance judgment ([2012] EWHC 3074 (Ch) (02 November 2012), on appeal [2013] EWCA Civ 1465 (15 November 2013)) was the claimant's name. It turns out that I should have read Arnold J's judgment more carefully, because a footnote tells the reader that "Starbucks HK’s name came from the bucks raised by the sale of Star [a Chinese-language TV station] by Richard Li’s Pacific Century group to Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation", who of course were the parent company of the defendants in the present case. So the claimant is nothing to do with the purveyor of what my great friend Markus, from Munich, is pleased to refer to as "brown liquid", a generic beverage which he maintains is drunk on every occasion by every American, whether its is masquerading as coffee, tea, or beer or is some sort of soft drink.
Originally a trade mark infringement (and validity) and passing-off case, by the time it reached the Supreme Court (which has now handed down its judgment: [2015] UKSC 31 (13 May 2015)) it was only concerned with passing off and in particular whether it is good enough for the claimant to have international goodwill. That's a very important point in the law of passing off, so this is an interesting and (sad to admit) exciting case.
However, the outcome doesn't appear to be as exciting as I would have liked. Because they didn't actually have any paying customers in the UK, the claimants have no goodwill to protect (and having goodwill is essential for a passing-off action to lie, of course - part of Lord Oliver's classic trinity from the JIF Lemon case, Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc [1990] 1 WLR 491). Old cases show that sometimes a foreign trade can generate some goodwill in this country - taking bookings, for example - but making its TV programmes available online in the UK amounted to nothing more than advertising and created no protectable goodwill.
I am disappointed that the court should have taken such a narrow view of what constitutes goodwill. It is, of course, a tricky thing to define (and you should read my Dictionary of Intellectual Property Law to learn more on that score), but in the modern age (by which I mean on the Internet) surely businesses create what most people would recognise as goodwill by promoting their services in other jurisdictions. Goodwill is, certainly, local in nature, but I think it is time to move on from the old view of goodwill and to embrace the idea that a trade reputation (is it the same thing?) can exist without money changing hands. It is a small step from making the TV programmes available to online viewers in the UK and charging them even a small amount to watch, and it should not be on such small steps that these things turn. (But perhaps when I read the judgment carefully I will find the answer to that.)
It need not even make any difference to the final result. The court could have distinguished the old cases and held that there was protectable goodwill, but gone on to hold that no damage had been suffered. To my mind, that would be a more logical place for the law to have ended up in. I certainly don't say that the court was wrong in any way, and those old cases can't just be wished away, but I do think the ratio does not reflect what people who commonly use the world wide web expect, and the alternative route to the same result might have given a more satisfactory ride.
You can conveniently watch the hearing using these links, which I have copied from the Supremes' website:

Watch hearing
25 Mar 2015	Morning session	Afternoon session
26 Mar 2015	Morning session	Afternoon session

'via Blog this'

Failure to tell applicant about renewal of earlier trade mark infringes CTM rules

Lidl Stiftung v OHMI - Horno del Espinar (Castello) (Judgment) [2015] EUECJ T-715/13 (05 May 2015) is a weird case in the General Court. The German supermarket applied for a figurative trade mark in which the dominant element was the word, Castello, for various comestibles in classes 29, 30 and 31. It was opposed by the owner of a Spanish trade mark, also figurative and also with the dominant element being a single word, in its case Castelló. As I have learned when trying to communicate with Spanish people, that accent makes a world of difference (shifting the stress from the "e" to the "o"): I recall struggling to tell the Hertz representative from whom I had hired a car at Jerez airport the name of the village, Gaucín, to which I would be driving it, oblivious to the fact that the stress lay on the second syllable - and I was so proud of pronouncing the soft "c" correctly. I was also anxious because the Renault Grande Espace to which they had "upgraded" me (for which read, it's the only car we've got at the moment) was not much smaller than the village.

No-one, from OHIM and the Board of Appeal to the General Court, thought that they two were not similar: only Lidl tried to argue the contrary, and they were rather obliged to give that a whirl. Thank goodness for a bit of common sense somewhere in the EU trade mark system. But still, Lidl got what they wanted and the decision was annulled. How come? Simple, really, although the story is somewhat hidden in the turgid prose of the judgment (it is always so difficult to work out what happened, and why, in an EU case). It turned out that a failure by OHIM to provide Lidl wth information about the opponent's filings meant that the applicant was unable to mount its defence properly. (I think that's a fair summary). So, a procedural irregularity on the part of the office - hard to believe, with everything being so thoroughly automated in Alicante, but there it is, nothing is perfect.